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BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROFESSORS AS 
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 The National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL) is a nonprofit voluntary 
professional bar association that works on behalf of 
criminal defense attorneys to ensure justice and due 
process for those accused of crime or misconduct. 
NACDL was founded in 1958. It has a nationwide 
membership of many thousands of direct members, 
and up to 40,000 with affiliates. NACDL’s members 
include private criminal defense lawyers, public 
defenders, military defense counsel, law professors, 
and judges. NACDL is the only nationwide 
professional bar association for public defenders and 
private criminal defense lawyers. NACDL is 
dedicated to advancing the proper, efficient, and just 
administration of justice. NACDL files numerous 
amicus briefs each year in the U.S. Supreme Court 
and other federal and state courts, seeking to 
provide amicus assistance in cases that present 
issues of broad importance to criminal defendants, 
                                                
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and both 
of their letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Under 
Rule 37.6 of the Rules of this Court, amicus states that no 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person 
other than amicus or its counsel made a monetary contribution 
to its preparation or submission. 
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criminal defense lawyers, and the criminal justice 
system as a whole.  
NACDL is keenly interested in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the 
context of the scope of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, and the prospect of authority for 
ostensibly non-criminal investigative searches 
serving as a tool for evading the warrant 
requirement for criminal investigations. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 OF THE ARGUMENT 
______ 
 
In Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 
553 (7th Cir. 2014), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the 
distinctions among the exigent circumstances 
doctrine, the emergency aid doctrine, and the 
community caretaking doctrine “are not always 
clear.” In turn, these fuzzy distinctions have led to a 
“lack of clarity in judicial articulation and 
application of the three doctrines.” Id. at 553 n.5. 
This lack of clarity means that courts deciding 
whether the community caretaking doctrine should 
apply to warrantless home entries often think that 
doctrine is needed to justify entries that are already 
covered by the exigent circumstances doctrine and/or 
the emergency aid doctrine.  
As set forth in this amici brief, this Court’s 
opinions defining and applying the exigent 
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines establish 
that police officers would need to rely on the 
community caretaking doctrine as an independent 
justification for warrantless home entries in only two 
potential situations: to address (1) non-bodily harms 
such as nuisances; and (2) non-imminent threats of 
bodily harm. 
Framed in that fashion, it is clear that a 
separate and independent rationale such as 
“community caretaking” – which was generated by 
the special circumstances attendant to automobile 
searches – does not justify invasion of the sanctity of 
the home. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 455 (1971) (“The exceptions [to the warrant 
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requirement] are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and 
there must be ‘a showing by those who seek 
exemption * * * that the exigencies of the situation 
made that course imperative.’”).  
Indeed, the way that this Court distinguished its 
opinion in Coolidge in creating the community 
caretaking doctrine makes clear that the doctrine 
does not and should not apply to warrantless home 
entries. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-
48 (1973). In addition, the capacity for a “community 
caretaking” exception that permits warrantless 
searches of the home would invite its use as an end-





I. The Scope of the Exigent Circumstances 
  Doctrine 
 
This Court defined the exigent circumstances 
doctrine in its seminal case, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 
U.S. 499 (1978). In Tyler, public officials made three 
significant warrantless entries into a furniture store: 
(1) a first entry to fight a fire; (2) a second entry four 
hours after the fire was extinguished to determine 
the fire’s origin; and (3) a third entry weeks after the 
fire to take photos. Id. at 501-03.  
In finding that the first two warrantless entries 
were Constitutional, the Tyler Court held that “[o]ur 
decisions have recognized that a warrantless entry 
by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal 
when there is compelling need for official action and 
no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 509. The Tyler 
Court then held that “[a] burning building clearly 
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presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to 
render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 509. 
Moreover, the Court concluded that “officials need no 
warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable 
time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has 
been extinguished.” Id. at 510. Therefore, because 
the second entry was “no more than an actual 
continuation of the first,” it was Constitutional as 
well. Id. at 511. 
Conversely, the third entry weeks after the fire 
was unconstitutional because it was “clearly 
detached from the initial exigency and warrantless 
entry.” Id. According to the Tyler Court, at that 
point, additional entries could only be made (1) 
“pursuant to the warrant procedures governing 
administrative searches;” or (2) pursuant to a search 
warrant  “upon a traditional showing of probable 
cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.” 
Id. 
 Since Tyler, this Court has recognized other 
situations in which this exigent circumstances 
doctrine allows for warrantless home entries due to 
the “‘compelling need for official action and no time 
to secure a warrant.’” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
141, 149 (2013) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). 
These situations include the hot pursuit of a fleeing 
suspect, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 
42-43 (1976), and preventing the imminent 
destruction of evidence, see Kentucky v. King, 563 







II. The Scope of the Emergency Aid   
  Doctrine 
 
This Court recognized the emergency aid 
doctrine in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398 (2006). In Stuart, police officers responded to a 
call regarding loud music at a residence and, 
through a screen door and windows, saw four adults 
trying to restrain a juvenile. Id. at 400-01. The 
juvenile then broke free and punched one of the 
adults, who subsequently spit blood into a sink. Id. 
at 401. The officers then entered the residence. Id. In 
finding the entry was Constitutional under the 
emergency aid doctrine, the Stuart Court held that 
“law enforcement officers may enter a home without 
a warrant to render emergency assistance to an 
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from 
imminent injury.” Id. at 403. 
In Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009), this 
Court subsequently clarified the emergency aid 
doctrine. In Fisher, police officers responding to a 
complaint of a disturbance were directed by a couple 
“to a residence where a man was ‘going crazy.’” Id. at 
45. Upon arrival at the house, the officers saw “a 
pickup truck in the driveway with its front smashed, 
damaged fenceposts along the side of the property, 
and three broken house windows, the glass still on 
the ground outside.” Id. at 45-46. They also saw 
blood on one of the doors of the house as well as 
blood on the hood of the pickup truck and on clothes 
inside of it. Id. at 46. The back door to the house was 
locked, and the officers could see a couch blocking 
the front door. Id. They could also see Jeremy Fisher 
screaming and throwing things inside the house. Id. 
When the officers knocked on the front door, Fisher 
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refused to answer. Id. The officers could see that 
Fisher had a cut on his hand and “asked him 
whether he needed medical attention.” Id. When 
Fisher ignored this question and profanely told the 
officers to get a search warrant, the officers entered 
the house. Id. 
In finding that the entry was Constitutional 
under the emergency aid doctrine, the Fisher Court 
disagreed with the Court of Appeals of Michigan. Id. 
at 48. The Court of Appeals had held that the 
emergency aid doctrine did not apply because 
“[a]lthough there was evidence that there was an 
injured person on the premises, the mere drops of 
blood did not signal a likely serious, life-threatening 
injury.” People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 
786515, at *2 (Mich. App., March 25, 2008) 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed that the cut 
on Fisher’s hand “likely explained the trail of blood” 
and that Fisher “was very much on his feet and 
apparently able to see to his own needs.” Id. 
The Fisher Court, however, found that “[e]ven a 
casual review of Brigham City reveals the flaw in 
this reasoning.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49. According to 
the Court, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a 
likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the 
emergency aid exception.” Id. As support, the Fisher 
Court noted that “[t]he only injury police could 
confirm in Brigham City was the bloody lip they saw 
the juvenile inflict upon the adult.” Id. Moreover, the 
Court rejected Fisher’s argument that the officers 
lacked a subjective belief that he needed assistance 
because they did not summon emergency medical 
personnel. Id. Instead, the Fisher Court found that 
the test was “whether there was ‘an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing’ that medical 
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assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” 
Id.  
Fisher helps to explain cases in which the 
emergency aid doctrine applies but the traditional 
exigent circumstances framework might not. This 
Court has held that the exigent circumstances 
doctrine allows for warrantless home entries due to 
the “‘compelling need for official action and no time 
to secure a warrant.’” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 
(2013) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). Meanwhile, 
for the emergency aid doctrine to apply, public 
officials need “‘an objectively reasonable basis for 
believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or 
persons were in danger.” Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49.   
In Fisher, despite Fisher telling the officers to 
return with a warrant, it is questionable whether 
those officers had probable cause to obtain either a 
search or arrest warrant. But, unlike the exigent 
circumstances doctrine as a whole, the emergency 
aid doctrine – a subset thereof – is  not premised on 
expediting an entry rather than waiting to secure a 
warrant. Instead, because there was an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that Fisher needed 
medical assistance and/or was in danger, the officers 
could enter, regardless of whether and when they 
could secure a warrant. Moreover, as the Stuart 
Court noted, the emergency aid doctrine also allows 
for warrantless entries “to protect an occupant from 








III. The Scope of a Possible Community  
  Caretaking Doctrine for Warrantless  
  Home Entries 
 
This Court recognized the community caretaking 
doctrine in the automobile context in Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973), holding that 
a warrant is not required when police officers are 
reasonably performing “community caretaking 
functions, totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal statute.” While this Court 
has never explicitly addressed when or if this 
doctrine applies to warrantless home entries, the 
preceding descriptions of the scope of the exigent 
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines help 
bring into focus the question currently before the 
Court. 
 Simply put, given the existence of the exigent 
circumstances and emergency aid doctrines, both of 
which allow for warrantless home entries, reliance 
on – and any need for – the community caretaking 
doctrine as authority for warrantless home entry 
would apply in only two situations:  (1) non-bodily 
harms such as nuisances; and (2) non-imminent 
threats of bodily harm. In any other situation 
conceivably triggering the community caretaking 
doctrine, police officers can already rely upon the 








 A. Non-Bodily Harms Such as    
   Nuisances 
 
Some courts have applied the community 
caretaking doctrine to warrantless home entries in 
cases involving dangers that they acknowledge are 
not as serious as the threat of bodily harm covered 
by the emergency aid doctrine or the compelling 
needs covered by the exigent circumstances doctrine. 
Many of these cases involve nuisances. For example, 
in United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1509 (6th 
Cir. 1996), police officers made a warrantless entry 
into a house after receiving a loud noise complaint 
from a neighbor. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit initially noted that “the ‘danger’ 
here, loud music, does not rise to the level of the 
dangers recognized in prior cases” involving the 
exigent circumstances and emergency aid doctrines. 
Id. at 1519. 
The court then held, though, that “although the 
Warrant Clause certainly is not irrelevant to the 
governmental intrusion at issue here, that clause 
nevertheless is implicated to a lesser degree when 
police officers act in their roles as ‘community 
caretakers.’” Id. at 1523. Specifically, “[b]ecause 
the...officers were not engaged in the ‘often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’...there 
is less cause for concern that they might have rashly 
made an improper decision.” Id. The court also found 
it untenable “to insist that, despite their community 
caretaking role, the officers must have established 
‘probable cause,’ as that term is used in the context 
of criminal investigations, before they could enter 
Defendant’s home.” Id. Therefore, having found that 
the officers’ home entry was motivated by a 
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community caretaking interest, the Sixth Circuit 
found “that their failure to obtain a warrant does not 
render that entry unlawful.” Id. 
Other courts similarly have applied the 
community caretaking doctrine to warrantless home 
entries based on noise complaints while 
acknowledging the lesser risk of harm in such cases. 
See, e.g., Olson v. State, 56 A.3d 576, 606 (Md. App. 
2012) (applying the community caretaking exception 
to a complaint regarding noise that did not endanger 
the lives of neighbors but instead endangered “the 
peace and good order of the community”); Bies v. 
State, 251 N.W.2d 461, 471 (Wis. 1977) (applying the 
community caretaking doctrine to a noise complaint 
while acknowledging that “[i]t is apparent that the 
information the officer had could justify little police 
intrusion upon the privacy of a citizen”). 
 
 B. Non-Imminent Threats of Bodily  
   Harm 
 
This case involves the second situation in which 
police officers would need to seek to rely on the 
community caretaking doctrine to justify a 
warrantless home entry: to address non-imminent 
threats of bodily harm. Courts have reached 
different conclusions on the question of whether the 
community caretaking doctrine applies in this 
situation while framing the issue in similar ways.  
In Corrigan v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 
1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2016), police officers were 
dispatched to the defendant’s house after being given 
information about an attempted suicide by a subject 
who “was possibly armed with a shotgun.” 
Eventually, the defendant voluntarily left his home, 
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closing and locking the front door behind him. Id. at 
1027. The defendant surrendered himself into the 
officers’ custody and admitted himself to a Veterans 
Hospital for PTSD symptoms but did not consent to 
a search of his home. Id. Nevertheless, police officers 
completed two warrantless entries into his home and 
seized weapons, including firearms. Id. In finding 
that neither the community caretaking doctrine nor 
any warrant exception applied, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held 
that there was no objectively reasonable factual 
basis to believe there was an imminent threat of 
bodily harm. Id. at 1031.  
Conversely, other courts have applied the 
community caretaking doctrine in similar 
warrantless home entry cases based on non-
imminent threats of bodily harm. In Mora v. City of 
Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2008), the 
defendant made a 911 call, saying he was suicidal 
and had weapons in his apartment. After officers 
arrived and drove the defendant to a hospital to see 
a psychiatrist, there was a warrantless entry into 
the defendant’s apartment and the seizure of 
firearms. Id. In finding this entry justified under the 
community caretaking doctrine, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
acknowledged that the officers dissipated the 
emergency by taking the defendant to the hospital. 
Id. at 228. But, despite the lack of an imminent 
threat of bodily harm, the court still authorized the 
warrantless entry because, inter alia, the police had 
no way of knowing whether the defendant “might 
return to the apartment more quickly than expected 
and carry out some desperate plan.” Id. 
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Similarly in Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930 
F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2019), the defendant 
mentioned “‘[s]hooting up schools’ and that he had a 
‘gun safe full of guns’” during a welfare check. After 
officers detained the defendant and placed him in an 
ambulance to travel to a hospital for a psychological 
evaluation, there was a warrantless entry into his 
house, uncovering firearms. Id. at 1128. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied 
the community caretaking doctrine despite the lack 
of an imminent threat of bodily harm because the 
defendant “might have had access to a firearm in the 
near future...should he return from the hospital.” Id. 
at 1140. 
Finally, in the present case, there was a 
warrantless entry into the defendant’s house that 
uncovered firearms after he was transported to a 
hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Caniglia v. 
Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2020). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
applied the community caretaking doctrine, finding 
an “imminent” or “immediate” threat of bodily harm 
because the defendant could have accessed the 
firearms after he returned from the hospital. Id. at 
131-33. But, the court added two caveats: “First, the 
terms ‘imminent’ and ‘immediate,’ as used 
throughout this opinion, are not imbued with any 
definite temporal dimensions.” Id. 126. Second, the 
court noted: “Nor is our use of these terms meant to 
suggest that the degree of immediacy typically 
required under the exigent circumstances and 
emergency aid exceptions is always required in the 
community caretaking context.” Id. As support for 
this second caveat, the court cited Sutterfield for the 
proposition that “‘[t]he community caretaking 
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doctrine has a more expansive temporal reach’ than 
the emergency aid exception.” Id. (quoting 
Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 561). In other words, while 
the First Circuit facially stated that the threat in 
Caniglia was imminent and immediate, its caveats 
make clear that the court was actually addressing a 
non-imminent threat of future bodily harm. 
 
IV. The Community Caretaking Doctrine  
  Should Not be Extended From Vehicles 
  to Homes 
 
Both the exigent circumstances doctrine and the 
emergency aid doctrines justify warrantless entries 
based upon imminent threats. Specifically, the 
exigent circumstances doctrine allows police officers 
to address imminent, “emergency conditions” such as 
fires, fleeing suspects, and the “imminent 
destruction of evidence” without needing to wait for 
a warrant. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. Meanwhile, the 
emergency aid doctrine allows warrantless entries so 
that police officers can “render emergency assistance 
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from 
imminent injury.” Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403. In Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48, this Court 
similarly created the community caretaking doctrine 
based on “immediate and constitutionally 
reasonable” concerns about safety that can be 
connected to vehicles that are not adjacent to 
dwellings. 
Notably, in creating this doctrine, and in 
distinguishing this Court’s opinion in Coolidge, this 
Court effectively explained both why the community 
caretaking doctrine cannot apply to warrantless 
home entries in general and the specific entry in this 
21 
 
case. In Coolidge, after police officers collected seven 
firearms from Edward Coolidge’s house, they 
arrested him on suspicion that he had murdered a 
fourteen year-old girl. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 445-47. 
Subsequently, pursuant to a search warrant for 
objects used in the murder, the officers impounded 
Coolidge’s car that was parked in his driveway and 
searched it, finding particles of gun powder. Id. at 
447-48.  
But, because the warrant was not issued by a 
neutral and detached magistrate, this Court had to 
decide whether the search was Constitutional 
despite the lack of a lawful warrant. Id. at 449-53. 
The Coolidge Court then found that the search was 
unconstitutional because, inter alia, the car “was 
regularly parked in the driveway of [Coolidge’s] 
house” and there was “no suggestion that, on the 
night in question, the car was being used for any 
illegal purpose.” Id. at 460. 
Subsequently in Cady, 413 U.S. at 446-47, this 
Court explicitly distinguished Coolidge to create the 
community caretaking doctrine. In Cady, police 
officers towed a Ford Thunderbird that was disabled 
in a car accident, and a warrantless search of the 
vehicle uncovered bloodied items. Id. at 436-38. In 
creating the community caretaking doctrine, the 
Cady Court distinguished Coolidge because “[t]he 
Thunderbird was not parked adjacent to the 
dwelling place of the owner as in Coolidge..., nor 
simply momentarily unoccupied on a street.”  Id. at 
446-47. Rather, because the Thunderbird was “was 
neither in the custody nor on the premises of its 
owner,” there was an “immediate and 
constitutionally reasonable...concern for the safety of 
the general public who might be endangered if an 
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intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the 
vehicle.” Id. at 447-48.  
The Cady Court therefore found that a car in a 
public space can present imminent threats that a car 
in a driveway cannot. The lack of a similar imminent 
threat in a car parked in a defendant’s driveway 
thus explains why the search of the car in Coolidge 
was unconstitutional. Moreover, this absence of an 
imminent threat would explain why courts have 
found that warrantless searches of cars parked in 
driveways are not covered by the community 
caretaking doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 236 
P.3d 834, 838-41 (Or. App. 2010) (citing Coolidge to 
find that the community caretaking doctrine did not 
apply to a vehicle parked in the defendant’s 
driveway); see also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 
F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (“But no such public 
safety concern is implicated by the facts of this case 
involving a vehicle parked in the driveway of an 
owner who has a valid license.”); Gombert v. Lynch, 
541 F.Supp.2d 492, 500 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding the 
warrantless search of the defendant’s car parked in 
his driveway was unconstitutional because the court 
could “find no law...to support the proposition that, 
under the banner of ‘community caretaking,’ the 
police can search and seize items from a vehicle that 
was not itself already under police custody or control 
via the police’s community caretaking function”).  
Given that in Cady this Court acknowledged its 
prior recognition that a person’s privacy interest is 
less substantial in her vehicle than in her home, see 
Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, there is even less justification 
for applying the community caretaking doctrine to 
warrantless home searches than there is for 
applying it to vehicles parked next to homes. In the 
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words of the Coolidge Court, the dangers that the 
community caretaking doctrine would cover in 
connection with warrantless home searches are not 
imperative enough to add it to the “jealously and 
carefully drawn” exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.  
Finally, there are strong public policy reasons to 
avoid extending the community caretaking doctrine 
to warrantless home entries. Courts have recognized 
the heightened risk that police officers might use the 
community caretaking doctrine as pretext or 
subterfuge to search vehicles for contraband or other 
illegal activity. See, e.g., State v. Rinehart, 617 
N.W.2d 842, 844 (S.D. 2000) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. 
App. 1995) (“We recognize that ‘[t]he ‘community 
caretaking’ exception should be cautiously and 
narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that 
it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting 
an investigatory search for criminal evidence.’”); 
State v. Maddox, 54 P.3d 464, 469 (Idaho App. 2002) 
(“Allowing officers to conduct community caretaking 
stops whenever they anticipate that a citizen might 
be about to embark upon an unwise venture would 
present far too great an opportunity for pretextual 
stops and far too great an imposition on the privacy 
interests of our citizenry to comport with the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
Moreover, courts have begun to realize that this 
risk intensifies with warrantless home entries. In 
People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999) (quoting 
3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed.1996) § 6.6(b), 
p. 402)), the Supreme Court of California upheld 
application of the community caretaking doctrine to 
a warrantless home entry to check the well-being of 
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the homeowner while acknowledging that “‘courts 
must be especially vigilant in guarding against 
subterfuge, that is, a false reliance upon the 
[personal safety or] property protection rationale 
when the real purpose was to seek out evidence of 
crime.’” Subsequently, twenty years later, the same 
court found that this risk of subterfuge was too great 
and thus concluded that “the community caretaking 
exception asserted in the absence of exigency is not 
one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the 
residential warrant requirement.” People v. Oviedo, 
446 P.3d 262, 271-76 (Cal. 2019).   
Indeed, in terms of the two types of situations 
identified in this brief, there should be concern that 
“a police officer may use the false pretext of a 
community caretaking ‘welfare check’ or loud music 
as pretexts for investigation of suspected drug 
trafficking or possession of illegal firearms.” Mark 
Goreczny, Note, Taking Care While Doing Right by 
the Fourth Amendment: A Pragmatic Approach to the 
Community Caretaker Exception, 14 Cardozo Pub. L. 
Pol’y & Ethics J. 229, 253-54 (2015).  
Furthermore, an expansion of the community 
caretaking doctrine would create incentives for law 
enforcement to use it to engage in warrantless, 
purportedly non-criminal searches and seizures that 
were simply stalking horses for criminal 
investigations that lacked probable cause.  
Consequently, if the community caretaking doctrine 
is extended to warrantless home entries, the “public 
perception of the police may shift dramatically from 
expecting them to engage in genuine community 
caretaking activities, to suspicion of police as using 
community caretaking as a pretext to investigate 





The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
reversed. 
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